Amy Bartholomew is an associate professor at Carleton university, Ottawa, Canada. She has a B.A. (Colorado), an M.A. from Carleton University, an LL.B. from the University of Ottawa and a Ph.D. in progress (New School for Social Research).
Her research interests include postfoundational legal and social theory from Habermas to postmodernism, theories of justice and injustice, theories and practices of human rights, the implication of multiculturalism and globalization for human rights, justice and constitutionalism, and feminist theories of law.
Ph.D.Sociology-ABD Graduate Faculty, New School University, New York, N.Y., USA
1986 LL.B. Common Law Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
1982 M.A. Political Science Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
1978 B.A. Psychology University of Colorado, Boulder, Co. USA
1993 - Present Associate Professor, Department of Law, Carleton
1986 - 1993 Assistant Professor, Department of Law Carleton University (Tenure received 1991)
1979 - 82 Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Carleton University
1989 Expert Consultant, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Review of
Criminal Code of Canada, 'Sex Crimes' (Sexual assault, pornography /obscenity)
1986 Legal Policy Consultant, Correctional Law Review, Corrections Policy, Department of the Solicitor General, Ottawa
1983 - 1984 Legal Policy Consultant, Correctional Law Review, Corrections Policy, Department of the Solicitor General, Ottawa
1984 Research Assistant, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Professor A. Bayefsky
1984 Research Assistant, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Professor M. Bendel
1982 Researcher, School of Public Administration, Carleton University, Professors Bruce Doern and Michael Prince
1977 - 79 Social Worker, Children's Services, Columbiana County Welfare Department, Lisbon, Ohio, U.S.A.
2000 - 2001 Recipient of CUSA’s teaching award June 2001. One of ten Carleton professors
chosen for excellence in teaching by undergraduate Carleton University students.
1998 - 99 Nominated by Graduate Students’ Association for Excellence in Teaching Award
1993 - 94 Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, Prize Fellowship 1990 - 92 (Most prestigious fellowship at GF: full tuition, approximately $12,000 U.S., plus $7,000 U.S. stipend per year for 3 years).
1990 - 91 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral Fellowship, awarded and declined (full tuition, plus approximately $13,000 per year for 3 years)
1989 - 90 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral Fellowship, awarded and declined (full tuition, plus approximately $12,000 per year for 3 years)
1986 Ontario Graduate Scholarship, awarded and declined (approximately $12,300 per year for 3 years)
1985 Stein Rokkan Memorial Fellowship, International Political Science Association Conference, Paris, France (one of nine chosen in international competition to participate in conference as a Stein Rokkan Fellow)
1981 - 82 University of Michigan - Carleton University Scholarship, for study of Quantitative Research Methods at the University of Michigan (summer)
1979 - 82 Carleton University Graduate Scholarship
1. Refereed Scholarly Publications:
“Does a Deliberative Approach to Group-Differentiated Rights ‘Make
all the Difference’?” Women and Constitutional Change edited by Alexandra Dobrowlosky and Vivien Hart
(Palgrave, forthcoming 2002) 33 manuscript pages.
“Toward a Deliberative Legitimation of Human Rights” 6 Warwick-Sussex Papers in Social Theory. (2001) 5-31.
“Democratic Citizenship, Social Rights and the ‘Reflexive Continuation’of the Welfare State” 42 Studies in Political Economy. (Autumn 1993) 141-156.
“Achieving a Place for Women in a Man's World': Or, Feminism with No Class” 6 (1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (Fall 1993) 22-50.
“Nomads of the Present: Melucci's Contribution to 'New Social Movement Theory'” (with Margit Mayer) 9(4) Theory, Culture and Society (1992) 141-159.
“What's Wrong with Rights?” (with Alan Hunt), 9 Journal of Law and Inequality (1990) 1- 58.
2. Other Scholarly Publications:
“Should a Marxist Believe in Marx on Rights?” in The Retreat of
the Intellectuals: The Socialist Register 1990 edited by Ralph Miliband, John Saville and Leo Panitch
(London, Merlin Press, 1990) 244-264.
Introduction to Public Law edited by A.L. Bartholomew, D.W. Elliott, G. Goodwin-Gill, M.J. Mac Neil and J.G. Neuspiel (Toronto: Captus Press 1989, Second Edition 1991).
Introduction to Legal Studies edited by N. Sargent, B. Wright, A. Bartholomew, P. Swan, A. Hunt, B. Dawson, R. Mohr and D. Fraser (Toronto: Captus Press 1990, Revised edition 1991) (primary editorial responsibility with Sargent and Wright).
Plenary and Invited Lectures:
November 2000 Invited lecture, University of Sussex Social Theory
Seminar, Brighton, England. “Constitutional Patriotism and Social Inclusiveness: Justice for Immigrants?”
June 1999 “Reconstituting Human Rights for the 21st Century” International Conference, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, England. Invited and funded plenary lecture, “Legitimating Human Rights Deliberatively?”
November 1997 “Gleichheit in ungleichen Verhaltnissen?” (Equality in Unequal Conditions?) International Conference, Berlin, Germany. Invited and fully funded plenary lecture, “Toward a Radical Deliberative Democracy: Justice, Gender, Struggle and Rights.”
March 1993 New York University Law and Society Colloquium, New York, New York, Invited and fully funded lecture, “Mining the Unthematized Gender Subtext: Social Rights, Civil Society and Feminism.”
Major Conference Papers:
May 2002 Philosophy and Social Science Colloquium, Prague, Invited
paper “Critical Theory and the Problem of Immigration: From a Liberal to a Critical Conception of Justice
August 2001 American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, Anaheim, California. Organizer of panel on “Citizenship, Social Integration and Identity: Debating ‘Constitutional Patriotism'” and paper giver “Constitutional Patriotism: Justice for Immigrants?”
November 2000 Colloquium on Constitutionalism, Exeter, England. Invited and funded participant.
August 2000 International Political Science Association Conference, Quebec City, Quebec, Canada. Invited paper “Constitutional Patriotism and Social Inclusiveness: Agonism and a Discursive theory of Human Rights.”
September 1999 Nationalism, Identity and Minority Rights Conference, University of Bristol, England. “Does a Deliberative Approach to Group-Differentiated Rights ‘Make all the Difference’?”
June 1999 World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy conference, “The Transformation of Legal Systems and Economies in an Age of Global Interdependence”, New York, NY. “Constitutional Patriotism and Multiculturalism.”
August 1998 American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, San Francisco, Ca., Invited Discussant, Critics of Critical Theory Panel.
June 1998 American Law and Society Association Annual Meetings, Aspen, Colorado, “Justifying Rights Democratically: Living Without Guarantees.”
June 1998 Canadian Law and Society Association Annual Meetings, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, “Grounding Rights Democratically: Living Without Guarantees.”
June 1998 Canadian Law and Society Association Annual Meetings, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, “Towards a Radical Deliberative Democracy: Justice and Gender.”
August 1993 American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, Miami, Fla., “Social Rights and the 'Reflexive Continuation' of the Welfare State.”
June 1993 Canadian Law and Society Association Annual Meetings, Ottawa, “The Implications of Discourse Ethics for Rights and Law.”
June 1993 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Political Economy Section, Ottawa, “Democratic Citizenship and Social Rights” (co-sponsored by Canadian Association of Sociology and Anthropology)
1991 American Bar Association, Commission on College and University Nonprofessional Legal Studies, Litigation, Justice and the Public Good Conference, San Diego, California. Invited and funded participant on “Teaching Law and Society” panel and “Teaching about the Civil Rights Movement: Litigation and Other Strategies.”
Other Professional Activities:
Studies in Political Economy
Current Perspectives in Social Theory
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law
Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice
Canadian Journal of Law and Society
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Research Grants Program, Spring 2000
Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada: Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, Summer 1999
Scholarly Work in Progress:
“Human Rights and Post-Imperialism: Arguing for a Deliberative Legitimation of Human Rights” 60 manu. pages. Submitted.
“Constitutional Patriotism and Social Inclusiveness: Justice for Immigrants?” 41 manu. pages. Submitted.
Amy Bartholomew and Jennifer Breakspear
It is the
very universalistic core of democracy and human rights itself which forbids its universal propagation by fire
war of aggression against Iraq displays, for at least the fourth time since 1990 (the first three occasions
being the Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the American attack on Afghanistan), the ‘revolutionary’
nature of the developments afoot in the transition from the ‘first’ to the ‘second age of modernity’.
Yet any transition that may be underway is neither an historical necessity nor a clean break with the past.
Rather, it is shaping up to be a contradictory and contested set of processes, since the politics of
the ‘first age of modernity’ are intertwined with those emerging in its ‘second age’. In emphasizing
that cosmopolitanism has brought with it the ‘military humanism of the West’, Beck saw it as ‘founded
on an uninterrogated world monopoly of power and morality’. But in making this argument he seemed to run
together three distinct stances toward the relationship between international law and human rights:
noninterventionism, cosmopolitanism, and what can only be called imperialism (however ‘benign’) – i.e.
a situation where a self-appointed hegemonic power ‘defends’ human rights abroad by engaging in ‘military
We wish to suggest that justifications for the most recent Gulf war fall predominantly
third category, resting on a predatory rhetorical commitment to a
cosmopolitan conception of human rights that is, in fact, wielded in the service of an imperialist project,
rather than what Jürgen Habermas calls an ‘egalitarian universalism’.
The dangers people face under these conditions are, of course, ‘asymmetrical’ - who
faces what dangers is deeply important.
Yet reliance on a cosmopolitan conception of human rights as ideological cover for imperialist world
politics also poses universalistic risks undermining not only the norm of non-intervention so central to the
international legal architecture of the ‘first age of modernity’, but also the nascent development of
cosmopolitan conceptions of law and human rights of the ‘second age’.
It is remarkable in this respect that it is not just the neo-conservative hawks in the Bush
administration and right-wing think tanks who justified this war against
This essay asks how is it that liberals justify military humanism in the name of protecting freedom,
human rights and democracy, even when it is pursued unilaterally by a self-appointed imperialist power.
We will focus on the justifications put forward by Michael Ignatieff, the Director of the Carr Center
for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, whose prominent writings in the New
York Times Magazine in the run-up to the war and during it
exemplify the ‘military humanism’ that Beck diagnosed.
In self-consciously embracing both the 'military humanism' currently espoused by many advocates of human
rights and American imperialist politics, Ignatieff starkly reveals
the dangers that reside in liberal nationalist conceptions of world politics and human rights when these are articulated by a
self-appointed hegemonic power. While cosmopolitan justifications of military intervention may have played a
prominent role elsewhere (pre-eminently in
analysis is premised on a 'critical cosmopolitanism' that we think is required to underpin any genuinely
universal respect for, and protection of, human rights and popular sovereignty. But this position is deeply
suspect in the eyes of many on the Marxist Left, as seen for example in the recent writings of Tariq Ali,
Perry Anderson and Peter Gowan. We endorse their criticisms of 'military humanism' undertaken by imperialist
powers but in the second part of this essay we shall suggest that to develop anti-imperialist, pro-human
rights and democratic politics today requires us not to dismiss international law and institutions. And in
order to develop a critical cosmopolitanism of this kind we also need to avoid the ‘instrumentalism’ that
is evident in Left critiques of the UN and of human rights. Rather,
human rights and transnational institutions like the UN can be crucial arenas of struggle – as Marxists
used to say – made more, not less, pertinent by the emergence of an imperialist power bent on
self-legitimation and unilateral assertion in every instance that suits it.
I. Interrogating Ignatieff’s ‘I
The United Nations lay dozing like a dog
before the fire, happy to ignore Saddam, until an American president seized it by the scruff of the neck and
made it bark. Multilateral solutions to the world's problems are all very well, but they have no teeth unless
Who wants to live in a world where there are
no stable rules for the use of force by states? Not me.
Who wants to live in a world ruled by the military power of the strong?
Not me. How will we oblige American military hegemony to
pay ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind’? I don’t know.
When the smoke of battle lifts, those who support the war will survey a battle zone that will include the
ruins of the multilateral political order created in 1945….To support the war entails a commitment to
rebuild that order on new foundations.
Long seen as a principled left-liberal,
Michael Ignatieff ‘plumped’ – a term he has borrowed from
this echoed Ignatieff’s long-standing position that human rights considerations in the contemporary period
have made judgments about war and the use of force complicated, as seen in his support for the military
Ignatieff admitted well before the war
that the idea of an Empire’s burden – American imperial power at work under what he views as the ‘official
moral ideology of Empire – i.e. human rights’ – was far removed from that which had been sought by
liberal cosmopolitan human rights activists and lawyers ‘who had hoped to see American power integrated
into a transnational legal and economic order organized around the UN….[Rather] a new international order
is emerging, but it is being crafted to suit American imperial objectives.’
He also recognized that while
we evaluate this position? On the one hand, Ignatieff recognizes
the realpolitik of the situation -- the horrors visited on the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein, the
fumbling, the weaknesses and the complicity of the UN system, the enormous power that the
after the officially declared end of war, no weapons of mass destruction and no links with Al Qaeda have
emerged. But insecurity and instability in the world have surely been increased, as clear-headed commentators
across the political spectrum acknowledge, not just by increased hatred for Western (and particularly
American) power and arrogance, but also by cluster bombs left over for Iraqi children to find, the pollution
of Iraqi towns and drinking water, ongoing guerilla warfare, and so on. Add to this that civilian casualties
produced during the ‘official’ war have been estimated by a British and US group of independent experts
to range between five and ten thousand, while the US Defence Department spokesperson says the Pentagon has
not looked into the question of civilian deaths because it was focused on ‘defeating enemy forces rather
than aiming at civilians.’
And now, Paul Wolfowitz admits that the WMD justification for war was ‘settled on’ by the American
administration ‘for bureaucratic reasons’, while Donald Rumsfeld concedes that WMD may never be found.
Finally, in a remarkable breach of his usual diplomatic demeanour, Hans Blix has admitted that the ‘bastards’
in the US administration viewed the UN as an ‘alien power’
and ‘leaned on’ the weapons inspectors to produce more damning reports while
initiating a smear campaign against him.
all of this, which hardly needs rehearsal for any critical observer of the war and its aftermath, we need to
consider the implications of the liberal hawks’ justification for war in terms of the categories of
morality and legality. What are we to make of a liberal intellectual of Ignatieff’s stature recommending
bypassing and potentially undermining fundamental norms of international law and resting his support so
squarely on the moral case for war waged by a ‘moral’ republican Empire?
Even if we were to assume that the
Ignatieff recognizes, imperialism threatens republicanism. As an
imperial power takes on the role of GloboCop, emphasizing military, police and secret spying power, the more
does it risk, as Habermas points out, ‘endangering its own mission of improving the world according to
This is obvious from such facts as the illegal detention of ‘enemy combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay
(and the US Supreme Court’s refusal to consider its unconstitutionality), the detention of ‘illegal
aliens’, the ill-treatment of US citizens suspected of ties to terrorist groups, and the treatment of
prisoners in Afghanistan and outside Baghdad Airport. Second, as Ignatieff acknowledges, following Thomas
Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence, morality requires that we pay ‘decent respect to the
opinions of mankind’. Ignatieff’s moral argument – who can
believe that 25 million Iraqis would not be better off without Saddam Hussein? –implies a universal right
to be free from oppression, and some version of this may indeed be defensible as a universal moral principle.
But the problem is not just that imperialism violates it, which it does by undercutting the republic’s
commitment to the rule of law both at home and abroad, but also that the basic moral principle and the
universalistic core of human rights should not be ‘confused’, as it is here, with the ‘imperial demand
that the political life-form and culture of a particular democracy …is to be exemplary for all other societies’.
Again, while Ignatieff is careful to call for an avoidance of the ‘narcissism’ of earlier empires, - i.e.
the delusion of earlier empires that their colonized aspired only to be ‘versions of themselves’
- his support for this war under these
unilateralist conditions cannot avoid ‘narcissism’ or, more forthrightly put, an imperialist imposition
of a false universalism.
Paying ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind’ requires an egalitarian universalism that
breaks with a liberal nationalist conception of republicanism and an imperial vehicle for its expansion. This
is so for many reasons but the core moral reason is that no 'republican' imperialism – even that of the
American 'republic' – can break from its provincial, particular perspective.
An egalitarian universalism, on the other hand, as Habermas says,
‘insists on the de-centering of each specific perspective; it requires the relativization of one’s
own interpretive perspective from the point of view of the autonomous Other.’
It is only in this way that even a ‘good hegemon’ could know whether the actions it justifies as in the
best interest of others is in fact equally 'good for all’.
We may summarize the moral problem as follows: The problem is that one party, even a ‘good hegemon’,
cannot morally assume a moral duty unilaterally. ‘Plumping’ for
war without taking into account the voices of all those others who also have interests at stake is immoral. Assuming a moral duty morally requires that those
affected are genuinely involved in shaping the contours of the response to oppression, mutually and
reciprocally. To do so would require, at a minimum, global political public spheres aimed at formulating a
response that takes into account everyone’s point of view. Second, and consequently, even a ‘good hegemon’
bases its justification (as Ignatieff admits) on the ethnocentric ground of liberal nationalism – aimed at
securing US safety, possibly at the expense of others and, very importantly, spreading the US’s particular
interpretation of human rights and democracy abroad. This is why unilateralism is morally unacceptable. This
is also why, as Habermas says, the ‘multilateral formulation of a common purpose is not one option amongst
others – especially not in international relations.’
This suggests why Ignatieff’s 'liberal hawk' position in support of unilateralism poses a moral
danger. But it also poses grave dangers to international law and the future of human rights. Ignatieff
implied that the war might be legal when he suggested that
In supporting this war Ignatieff also seemed to suggest that the international legal norms of
non-intervention and national sovereignty of the post-World War II era, the ‘first age of modernity’,
have run their course, when he acknowledged that the war would be waged on the ‘ruins of the multilateral
This is a dangerous derogation from the non-intervention principle because it violates the rule that the
legitimate authority to decide whether
Ignatieff clearly sees the path stretched out before us but shows little concern for its perils: ‘[a]
new international [legal] order is emerging, but it is being crafted to suit American imperial objectives.
The empire signs on to those pieces of the transnational legal order that suit its purposes…, while
ignoring or even sabotaging those parts…that do not.’
He claims he is neither apologising nor rationalising but rather stating the reality of international
law in an age of empire. The American Empire is not to be constrained by multilateral concerns. International
institutions that can be controlled and commandeered are to be retained, those that would require an
egalitarian framework and fail to guarantee American dominance are to be discarded. Ignatieff offers
essentially no juridical foundations for military humanism but merely approves as obvious the burden
International law failed in the lead-up to the invasion of
Habermas maintains that the neo-conservatives associated with the Bush Doctrine confront international
law ‘with a quite revolutionary perspective [asserting that]… when international law fails then the
politically successful hegemonic enforcement of a liberal world order is morally justifiable...’ even when
it is formally illegal.
What is remarkable, as we have emphasized, is that this is at least as characteristic of liberal hawks like
Ignatieff as it is of the American neo-conservatives. Still, this
seems perplexing. For why would one committed to human rights and
democracy, as Ignatieff surely is, but as Bush and Co. clearly are not, recognize yet fail to undertake a
consideration of the ‘revolutionary consequences’ attendant to this war aimed at pre-emption and ‘regime
change’ and threatening the sole, however flawed, international institution available today to deal with
such challenges? With the ratification of the UN Charter after World War II, states formally agreed to ‘give
up their sovereign right to go to war’. 
Since this war is premised on re-establishing that right perhaps it would be better to call this a ‘restoration’
rather than a ‘revolution’.The liberal hawks, not unlike the neo-conservatives, have thus supported a war
that is not only unjust and illegal but one that threatens to imbricate regressive norms in international
law. Michael Glenndon has stated, regarding the Kosovo
intervention by NATO, that if ‘power is used to do justice, law will follow.’
But this logic works equally in reverse: if power is used to do injustice, unjust law will follow.
And need we even say that this was not likely a ‘one off’ war? Plenty of commentators have made it
clear that it is the first in a series of such wars – as
Ignatieff implies when he claims that ‘[i]mperial ruthlessness requires optimism as a continued act of
The empire must remain vigilant against all that would stand in the way of its advance. Imperial
ruthlessness, however, seems also to require an elusive villain (Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, take your
pick) that can be stalked across borders. A well-oiled public relations machine, replete with politicians to
add accountability, embedded journalists to add 'integrity' and public intellectuals to add weight, lays the
groundwork for war without end.
We do not mean to suggest that Security Council approval for multilateral military force would have
wholly addressed the lack of legitimacy of the ensuing intervention. We recognise the undemocratic, not to
mention the undeliberative, nature of the Security Council and see that the bullying and bribery of the Bush
administration further undermined any possibility of achieving a legitimate decision taken by equals. But in
‘plumping’ for unilateral war, Ignatieff was also plumping for
future forms of unilateralism, and plumping against multilateralism
under international law and international institutions, pre-eminently the UN. A hegemonic unilateralism is
primed to step into the void between the discarded norms of the ‘first age of modernity’ and the (still
to be conceived) cosmopolitan norms and institutions of the ‘second age’. The key question is whether an
international law justification for war should be replaced with ‘empire’s law’, provided by the ‘unilateral
global politics of a self-empowering hegemon’.
We think the answer is clear: it should not. As Eric Hobsbawm
notes: ‘few things are more dangerous than empires pushing their own interest in the belief that they are
doing humanity a favour.’
 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity’, British Journal of Sociology, 51:1. p. 83.
Jürgen Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’,
This is a translation of “Was bedeutet der Denkmalsturz?” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17
April 2003, p. 33.
 On egalitarian universalism, see Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’ Here we develop the distinction between an imperialist liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism that Habermas has proposed and apply it to the liberal hawks’ analysis. See ibid., and Habermas, ‘Letter to America’, The Nation 16 December 2002 http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20021216&s=habermas .
See Jean Bethke Elstain,
Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American power in a Violent World, New
York: Basic Books, 2003; Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism, New York: WW Norton, 2003; and more generally, Kate Zernike, ‘Liberals
for War: Some of the Intellectual Left’s Longtime Doves Taking on Role of Hawks,’ New
York Times, 14 March 2003, and George Packer, “The Liberal Quandary over Iraq,” The
New York Times Magazine, 8 December 2002.
See especially Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, The New York
Times Magazine, 5 January 2003 and ‘I am Iraq’, The New York
Times Magazine, 23 March 2003.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 24.
Ignatieff, ‘Friends Disunited’, the Guardian, 24 March 2003, emphasis added.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 26.
Ignatieff, ‘I am Iraq’.
Ignatieff, ‘Friends Disunited’.
‘A Debate on American Power and the Crisis in Iraq’, moderated by Steve Wasserman, with: Christopher
Hitchens, Michael Ignatieff, Mark Danner, and Robert Scheer. Broadcast on
Radio Nation, March 19-25 2003, http://archive.webactive.com/radionation/rn20030319.html (accessed June
See Michael Ignatieff, ‘Time to Walk the Walk’, National Post,
14 February, 2003; and the quotation of him in Zernike, ‘Liberals for War’.
Michael Ignatieff, ‘A Bungling UN Undermines Itself’, The New
York Times, 15 May 2000.
Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism’, Social
Research, 69-4: p. 1145, 2002.
This was the term Doris Buss coined to characterize the hawks’
position at a Carleton University Anti-War Roundtable on 24 March 2003.
Ignatieff, ‘Time to Walk the Walk’.
Michael Ignatieff, ‘Barbarians at the Gate?’, The New York Review of Books, 49-3, 28 February 2002.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 50.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 24.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 50, emphasis added. Note as
well how this analysis of ‘frontier zones’ echoes that of the neo-conservative Thomas Barnett of the
Naval War College who emphasizes the dangers to the US of countries that are ‘disconnected’ from
economic globalization and the need to address this ‘gap’. See
Thomas P.M. Barnett, ‘The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Going to War and Why We’ll Keep
Going to War’, Esquire, March 2003.
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrules/ThePentagonsNewMap.htm Also see, Jim Lobe, ‘Pentagon Moving Swiftly to
Become ‘GloboCop’ Inter Press Service, 11 June 2003.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 54.
Michael Ignatieff, ‘Mission Possible’, The New York Review of Books, 19 December 2002.
Simon Jeffrey ‘The War May have Killed 10,000 Civilians, Researchers Say’, the Guardian,
13 June 2003.
David Usborne, ‘WMD just a convenient excuse for war, admits Wolfowitz’, the Independent,
30 May 2003. Also see Paul Krugman who suggested in the New
York Times that if the claim that Saddam ‘posed an immanent threat …was fraudulent, the selling of the
war is arguably the worst scandal in American political history….’ ‘Standard Operating Procedure’, New
York Times, 3 June 2003. The only surprising thing about
Senator Robert Byrd’s argument that ‘[w]e were treated to a heavy dose of overstatement concerning
Saddam Hussein’s direct threat to our freedoms’ is how few in Congress seem to have been scandalized.
‘The Truth Will Emerge’ http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_speeches/byrd_speeches_2003may/2.html
John O’Farrell, ‘Hans off the UN’, the Guardian, Friday June 13, 2003.
Helena Smith, ‘Blix: I was Smeared by the Pentagon’, the Guardian,
11 June 2003.
For a brilliant, and narrower articulation of this idea as a basic moral right to justification see
Rainer Forst, ‘The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a
Constructivist Conception of Human Rights’, Constellations 6,
no. 1 (1999): 35-60 and for an extension to transnationalism see Forst, ‘Towards a Critical Theory of
Transnational Justice’, in Global Justice, edited by Thomas W.
Pogge, 169-87. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
Habermas, ‘What does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’ para. 41, emphasis added.
Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, p. 53.
On this see, Amy Bartholomew “Human Rights and Post-Imperialism” 9 Buffalo
Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming 2003) and “Toward a Deliberative Legitimation of Human Rights”
6 Warwick-Sussex Papers in Social Theory. (2001).
Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’, para. 43.
Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’, para 47.
 See International Commission of Jurists, ‘Iraq – This War Must be Conducted Lawfully’
http://www.icj.org/news.html3?id_article=2774&lang=en (accessed June 9, 2003).
Also see The Center for Economic and Social Rights Emergency Campaign
on Iraq, ‘Tearing up the Rules: The Illegality of Invading Iraq’, March 2003.
May 31, 2003), Michael Ratner, ‘War Crime Not Self-Defense: The Unlawful War Against Iraq’,
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/print_page.asp?ObjID=BMreedARu7&Content=107 (accessed June 12, 2003) and
Phyliss Bennis, ‘Understanding the U.S.-Iraq Crisis: The World’s Response, the UN and
International Law’, pamphlet of the Institute for Policy Studies, January 2003.
Ignatieff, ‘Friends Disunited’.
Ignatieff, ‘Barbarians at the Gate?’.
Ignatieff, ‘Time to Walk the Walk’.
Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’, para. 10.
Ibid., para. 8. Habermas addresses his view of the differences
between NATO intervention in Kosovo and the 1991 Gulf war, both of which he supported, and the US’s most
recent war against Iraq, of which he is deeply critical, in ‘Letter to America’. On Kosovo, also see Jurgen Habermas, ‘Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Legality and Morality’ Constellations
6, no. 3, 1999.
Chandler cites Louis Henkin on this point, ‘International Justice’, p. 59.
Quoted in Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity: War, Law and Global
Order. London, Continuum Press, 2002, p. 67.
Ignatieff, ‘Barbarians at the Gate?’, p. 6.
Habermas, ‘What Does the Felling of the Monument Mean?’, para. 34. We borrow the
characterization of this as ‘empire’s law’ from Trevor Purvis’s comments at the Carleton University
Anti-War Roundtable on 24 March 2003.
Eric Hobsbawm, ‘America’s Imperial Delusion’, the Guardian,
14 June 2003.